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Introduction
Why does Deleuze claim that his philosophical concepts must be under-
stood “literally”? From an initial viewpoint, numerous aspects of his 
philosophy seem metaphorical, whether his concepts themselves (rhi-
zome, nomads, deterritorialization) or his related claims (we are made 
up of lines, the unconscious is a factory). Moreover, other philosophers 
have emphasized the metaphorical nature of language and concepts, 
including Nietzsche (truth is “a mobile army of metaphors”)1 and Der-
rida, whose essay “The White Mythology” emphasized the role of the 
rhetorical figure of “catachresis” in the creation of concepts (and con-
sidered the concept of the concept itself to be metaphorical or cat-
achrestic).2 The notion of metaphor presumes the distinction between 
the literal and the figurative, and the movement from a literal sense to 
a figurative appropriation—though even this understanding of meta-
phor is hardly straightforward. As Ted Cohen pointed out long ago, 
John Donne’s phrase “no man is an island” can be considered to be a 
metaphorical statement, though it is also literally true—no man is an 
island.3
Deleuze’s claim that his own concepts are “literal” is thus a compli-
cated one, and in the end the problem itself is not well-posed in terms of 
the literal-versus-metaphorical distinction. “There are no literal words, 
neither are there metaphors”, Deleuze writes. “There are only inexact 
words to designate something exactly”.4 With regard to concepts, he 
adds, “there is no question of difficulty or understanding: concepts are 
exactly like sounds, colors, or images, they are intensities that suit you or 
not, that work or don’t work [qui vous conviennent ou non, qui passent 
or ne passent pas]. . . . There’s nothing to understand, nothing to inter-
pret”.5 For Deleuze, we should approach concepts in philosophy in the 
same way that we approach sounds in music, images in films, or colors 
in paintings—that is, as intensities. But what then is the nature of the 
“inexactitude” that goes beyond the literal and the metaphorical, and 
which is defined purely intensively? To answer this question, or at least 
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establish an approach to the question, we need to consider the theory of 
sense developed by Deleuze in his 1969 text Logic of Sense.6
Three Dimensions of Language
In the second half of Logic of Sense, Deleuze traces out what he calls the 
dynamic genesis of language, drawing in part on texts from developmen-
tal psychology. “What renders language possible is that which separates 
sounds from bodies and organizes them into propositions, freeing them 
for the expressive function”.7 If a speaker suddenly lapsed into violent 
babbling and began to utter incomprehensible noises, one might suspect 
that they had collapsed into psychosis. The dynamic genesis of language 
follows the opposite movement: it “concerns the procedure that liber-
ates sounds and makes them independent of bodies”.8 In tracing out this 
genesis, Deleuze distinguishes between three dimensions of language—or 
rather, three “stages” of the dynamic genesis, although each stage coex-
ists reciprocally with the others: the primary order of language, which 
is found in the depths of the body; the secondary organization of lan-
guage, which is the surface of sense (and non-sense); and finally, the 
tertiary arrangement of language, which is found in the propositions of 
languages, with their various functions of designation, manifestation, sig-
nification, and expression.
Three Dimensions of Language
Tertiary 
Arrangement
Height Foundation Propositions: 
designation, 
manifestation, 
signification, 
expression
Secondary 
Organization
Surface Ground Sense
Primary Order Depth Groundless Intensities
1. The Primary Order of Language (noise, intensities). The dynamic 
genesis begins with the noises (or intensities) of the body, which consti-
tutes what Deleuze calls the primary order of language. His starting point 
is the nursing infant, and the clamorous, noisy depth of its body: cries 
and ringings, gurglings and burpings, crackings and poppings, teeth-
gnashings, jaw-grindings. This is the dimension of noise, a first type of 
non-sense, and a first type of sonorous system. At this level, “everything 
is passion and action, everything is communication of bodies in depth, 
attack and defense”.9 Daniel N. Stern describes the world of the infant 
(what Deleuze would call its “body without organs”) as a kind of human 
“weatherscape”, made up entirely of sequences of risings and fallings 
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of various intensities—the jolting of a bright light or a sharp noise, the 
calming of a voice, or the explosive breakout of a storm of hunger, with 
its knot of agony and cries, and then the passing of the storm when the 
baby is fed, and the subsequent sense of pleasure and satisfaction. It is a 
situation where the infant experiences no distinction between itself and 
the world, but only “intensities-in-motion”.10
2. The Tertiary Arrangement of Language (designation, manifesta-
tion, signification, and expression). The second stage of the dynamic 
genesis then appears, which is in fact the end point of the genesis—the 
tertiary arrangement of language. In the midst of this world of intensi-
ties, there is a particular noise, a voice from on high, namely the voices of 
parents or other adults. This transference from depth to height entails an 
entire reorientation of the psychic and corporeal life of the infant. Even 
before the infant can understand the voice, it grasps language as some-
thing that pre-exists itself, as something already there: the familial voice 
that conveys tradition, or that affects the child as already being the bearer 
of a name. As opposed to the primary order of language (pure noise as 
the dimension of the body), the voice participates in what Deleuze calls 
the tertiary arrangement of language (langue, a fully formed language), 
which is made up of sentences or propositions. We will only make some 
summary remarks of Deleuze’s characterization of this tertiary arrange-
ment, since his primary interest, as we shall see, concerns the secondary 
organization of sense.
In the important “Third Series” of the Logic of Sense, Deleuze analyzes 
in some detail the three primary dimensions of propositions in general, 
which he terms designation, manifestation, and signification. Designa-
tion, or denotation, is the relation of a proposition to an external state 
of affairs (“snow is white”, “that man is Socrates”). This is the rela-
tion of reference, which determines the truth value of the proposition 
(true or false). Manifestation marks the relation of the proposition to the 
beliefs and desires of the person who is speaking (“I desire to be loved”, 
“I believe the world will end tomorrow”). Its logical value is not the true 
and the false, but veracity and illusion. Signification, finally, is the rela-
tion of the proposition to other propositions, or to universal or general 
concepts. This is the domain of logic, with its relations of inference and 
demonstration between propositions (“implies”, “therefore”). Its logical 
value is no longer truth, as shown by the hypothetical mode of implica-
tions (if . . . then), but rather the condition of truth, the set of conditions 
under which the proposition would be true. The condition of truth is not 
opposed to the false but to the absurd, that which is without signification 
and thus neither true nor false.11
Propositions, in other words, can be related to the world and to objects 
within the world (designation); to subjects and their feelings, desires, and 
beliefs (manifestation); or to other propositions (signification). In Kan-
tian language, each of these dimensions of the proposition is founded on 
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a certain principle or concept: the World and its states of affairs are the 
principle of reference or denotation; the Self or Soul is the principles of 
manifestation; and God, as the combinatory of abstract predicates, is the 
principle of demonstration or the form of possibility (the Ens summum). 
These are precisely the three transcendent Ideas that Kant identified as 
the terminal points of metaphysics in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of 
the Critique of Pure Reason: the Self, the World, and God. Deleuze seems 
to be following Nietzsche—and many others—in suggesting that tradi-
tional metaphysical concepts are derived from language and its grammar, 
and from the most general structure of propositions or judgments.
Is it possible to find a common “ground” of these relations within the 
proposition? In fact and in principle, each of these three dimensions is 
reciprocally determined by the others, and none of them can be consid-
ered to be foundational. As the locus of truth, denotation or reference 
would initially seem to be the primary relation. However, in the domain 
of speech, it is obviously manifestation that is primary (the “I”), since 
neither denotation nor signification is possible without it. Yet insofar as 
a person always speaks a specific language (langue), significations are 
primary, and they exist before manifesting a subject or denoting a state 
of affairs. But in logic, inferences are empty unless the premises from 
which they are derived are true, which grounds them in the relation of 
denotation. And even if the premises are true, Lewis Carroll’s celebrated 
text, “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”, shows the fundamental para-
dox that lies at the heart of every theory of symbolic implication, which 
prevents it from exercising the role of a final foundation.12 In short, from 
denotation to manifestation to signification and back again, we are car-
ried along in the circle of the proposition, “a complex structure in which 
each of the three relations of the proposition in general is in turn pri-
mary”, a structure that can collapse if it loses this complementarity.13 It 
is this propositional structure as a whole that forms the tertiary arrange-
ment of language.14
For this reason, philosophers have often identified a fourth dimension 
to the proposition—something in the proposition that cannot be identi-
fied with the state of affairs it denotes, nor the beliefs and desires it mani-
fests, nor the concepts or inferences it signifies. This fourth dimension of 
the proposition is sense, which Deleuze, following Husserl, will call the 
dimension of expression: sense is what is “expressed” by a proposition.15 
To a certain degree, Deleuze is here indebted to the genius of thinkers like 
Frege and Russell, who discovered that the domain of sense was the con-
dition of truth, or denotation. The true–false distinction finds its ground 
in the sense–non-sense distinction: in order for a proposition to be true, it 
must have a sense. The proposition, “My gruba is the color of an ockbar”, 
is neither true nor false, since “gruba” and “ockbar” are non-sensical 
words. A proposition without sense is neither true nor false; it is merely 
non-sensical. “We position ourselves immediately within sense whenever 
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we denote”.16 But as a superior condition, sense is not only the condition 
of denotation; it is the form of possibility for the proposition itself, in all 
its dimensions. “Sense is always presupposed as soon as I begin to speak; 
I would not be able to begin without this presupposition”.17 It is sense, 
then, that constitutes the ground of the structure of the proposition, and 
it is the object of Deleuze’s analyses in Logic of Sense.18
But the concept of sense will function in two registers in Logic of 
Sense, and these two registers correspond to two aspects of the notion of 
surface. In the first register, sense is a result of the tertiary arrangement 
of language. It is the effect of an already-constituted proposition: sense 
is what is expressed by the proposition, its “meaning” or “semantic con-
tent”. This is the domain referred to when one says that the propositions 
“The tree is green” (English), “L’arbre est vert” (French) and “Der Baum 
ist grün” (German) all have the same meaning, even though this mean-
ing is “expressed” through different words in different languages.19 In 
Frege’s well-known example, “Venus is the morning star” and “Venus is 
the evening star” are both true propositions that refer to the same object 
(the planet Venus), but they each express a different sense, a different Sinn 
(morning star, evening star).20 Deleuze suggests that, in the history of 
philosophy, sense was first discovered by the Stoics (in a reaction against 
Platonism), a second time in the fourteenth century in Ockham’s school, 
by Gregory of Rimini and Nicholas d’Autrecourt (in reaction against the 
problem of universals), and a third time by the philosopher and logician 
Meinong (in reaction against Hegelian logic and its lineage).21
Much of the early part of Logic of Sense is devoted to an analysis of 
this first aspect of sense, not from the point of view of post-Fregean ana-
lytic philosophy, but rather in the context of the Stoic distinction between 
corporeal states of affairs and incorporeal events. As is often the case in 
his work, Deleuze rejuvenates a contemporary problem by reconsidering 
it from the viewpoint of the history of philosophy. For Deleuze, the para-
digmatic example of an incorporeal event is a battle, which has more-
over been the subject of well-known literary descriptions in Stendahl, 
Hugo, Tolstoy, and especially Stephen Crane.22 We can attribute “Battle 
of Waterloo”, for instance, to a particular state of affairs, but what we 
find in that state of affairs are bodies mixing with one another: spears 
stabbing flesh, bullets flying through the air, cannons firing, bodies being 
ripped apart. Strictly speaking, the battle itself exists nowhere except in 
the expression of my proposition, which attributes “Battle of Waterloo” 
to this mixture of bodies. More precisely, we could say that the battle 
itself merely “insists” or “subsists” in the proposition. Hence one of the 
fundamental theses of Logic of Sense: sense is to propositions what attrib-
utes like “Battle of Waterloo” are to states of affairs. They are pure events 
that subsist or insist in both propositions and states of affairs. This is also 
the first meaning that Deleuze gives to the term “surface”: sense is what 
lies at the surface between states of affairs and propositions. Sense is both 
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that which is expressed by propositions and that which is attributed to 
things (the static genesis). Logic of Sense provides detailed analyses of 
the structures (sterility, impassivity, neutrality) and paradoxes (indefinite 
proliferation, sterility, neutrality, absurdity) that characterize this first 
aspect of sense. We will not pursue these analyses here, which have been 
the object of a number of excellent studies.23
We might note, however, that what came to be known as the “phi-
losophy of language” tended to focus almost exclusively on this tertiary 
arrangement of language. It was preoccupied, for instance, with the con-
cept of truth, which is defined in terms of a proposition’s conformity 
with reality (reference) and logical principles (inference). But a deeper 
constraint was the focus on propositions themselves—that is, on the 
propositions of fully formed and already developed languages—without 
posing the question of their genesis. Bertrand Russell seems to have set 
the agenda for much subsequent philosophy when he declared in 1900: 
“That all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of proposi-
tions, is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand a proof”.24 Such an 
exclusive focus on propositions inevitably tended to confine the focus 
of the philosophy of language to the four primary dimensions of propo-
sitions: designation (the theory of reference, denotation, rigid designa-
tion), manifestation (the so-called propositional attitudes), signification 
(the principles of logic, inference, and demonstration), and expression 
(theories of meaning, and the meaning of meaning). To be sure, this is a 
vast simplification of the extraordinary work that took place in the phi-
losophy of language in the twentieth century, but it allows us to highlight 
the fact that Deleuze’s concerns took him in a different direction. In biol-
ogy, one does not discover the nature of the organism by simply examin-
ing a fully formed individual, since the individual itself is the result or 
effect of a complex genetic process, starting with the genetic code and 
passing through a series of developmental processes. The same is true of 
language: we are led astray if we analyze language in its full-blown adult 
state, without adopting a genetic point of view on it.
3. The Secondary Organization of Language (sense and non-sense). 
This brings us to the third aspect of the dynamic genesis, the third ele-
ment of language, which lies “between” the primary order of language 
(the body, pure noise, intensities) and the tertiary arrangement of lan-
guage (the proposition). This is what Deleuze calls the secondary organi-
zation of language, which is the domain of sense in its second register. 
Sense here is no longer a sterile effect of propositions (meaning or sematic 
content) but lies at the genesis of propositions. It is this second register of 
sense that is Deleuze’s primary interest in Logic of Sense. “At the heart 
of the logic of sense, one always returns to this problem, this immaculate 
conception, being the passage from sterility to genesis”.25
Here again, Deleuze uses Frege and Russell to provide an initial 
approach to the problem. Although Frege and Russell define sense as the 
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condition of the true, it is granted an extension larger than truth in order 
to account for the possibility of error: a false or erroneous proposition 
nonetheless remains a proposition endowed with sense. A proposition 
that does not have a sense can be neither true nor false; it is simply non-
sensical. But in this manner, although the sense–nonsense relation is prior 
to the truth–falsity relation, sense only grounds the truth of a proposition 
by remaining indifferent to what it grounds. As a result, the values of 
truth and falsity are allowed to continue in the same state as before, “as 
if they were independent of the condition assigned to them”.26 Truth still 
remains a matter of reference or denotation. This is why the determina-
tion of sense as expression is inadequate and is only the first aspect of 
the concept of sense.27 “What would be the purpose of rising from the 
domain of truth to the domain of sense”, Deleuze asks, “if it were only 
to find between sense and nonsense a relation analogous to that of the 
true and the false?”28 We cannot simply presume, in a Kantian manner, 
the existence of “truth” as a fact and then seek its condition in sense. The 
problem must be reformulated from the standpoint of genesis: “Truth 
and falsity do not concern a simple designation, rendered possible by a 
sense which remains indifferent to it. The relation between a proposition 
and what it designates must be established within sense itself: the nature 
of ideal sense is to point beyond itself towards the object designated”.29 
In other words, Deleuze’s aim is to provide a genetic account of truth, 
rather than seeking the conditions of truth as a mere “fact”. Truth must 
be seen to be a matter of production within sense (method of genesis) 
rather than adequation to states of affairs (method of conditioning).30
This then is what Deleuze considers to be “the most general problem of 
the logic of sense”: how do we move from understanding sense as a neu-
tral and sterile surface effect of propositions (expression) to grasping it as 
a fruitful principle of production? This second aspect of sense concerns 
sense as the element of the genesis of propositions, and no longer simply 
is the effect of propositions. “Sense was first discovered in the form of 
an impassible neutrality by an empirical logic of propositions, which had 
broken away from Aristotelianism; and then, for a second time, sense 
was discovered in the form of a genetic productivity by transcendental 
philosophy, which had broken away from metaphysics”.31 How then 
does sense function, in this second discovery, as an element of the genesis 
of propositions, rather than simply as the “expressed” meaning or effect 
of an already given proposition? And what is its relation to the literality-
metaphor problematic (insofar as metaphor is taken to be a transfer of 
sense from a literal or proper sense to a figurative sense)?
The Synthetic Surface Structure of Sense
In order to comprehend the structure of the secondary organization (the 
sense–nonsense relation), consider again the life of an infant. All of us 
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were born into what Deleuze calls the primary order of language: noise, 
which includes the primary sounds and affects of the body, with all its 
intensive variations. But in the midst of this, the infant hears a Voice on 
High, that is, the voices of those speaking an already constituted lan-
guage. How does the infant move from the primary order of the body 
to the tertiary arrangement of language? Answer: through the secondary 
organization of sense. For the infant, the Voice on High already has all 
the dimensions of the “tertiary arrangement” of language: it manifests the 
emotional variations of the speaker (the voice that loves and reassures, 
attacks and scolds, withdraws and keeps silent, complains about being 
wounded); it denotes certain states of affairs, such as the “good” object 
(the breast) or introjected objects (like food); and it signifies something, 
namely all the classes and concepts that structure this domain of pre-
existence. Yet the child itself does not know what the voice is denoting, 
manifesting, or signifying. For the child, the voice “has the dimensions 
of language without having its condition”, in other words, for the infant, 
the voice does not yet have a sense.32 Whereas the noise of the depths 
is an infra-sense, an under-sense, an Untersinn, the Voice on High is a 
pre-sense. It still awaits the “event” (sense) that functions as the genetic 
element of language itself. But of course this is not simply an experience 
of infants. The passage from noise to voice is relived when the sounds 
reaching sleeping people are organized into the voice ready to wake 
them. More obviously, we experience it when we encounter someone 
speaking a foreign language. The Greeks called foreigners “barbarians”, 
because when foreigners spoke, the Greeks heard only the babbling non-
signifying intensities of a non-Greek language (bar bar bar). They heard 
the voice, but they had no access to its sense. One could see that the voice 
had sense, that it “made sense”, but Greeks lacked access to the dimen-
sion of sense in the foreign language. In a similar way, Americans tend to 
caricature the vowel-y sound of French, just as the French tend to mock 
Americans for speaking as if they have a hot potato in their mouths, since 
most American vowel sounds are diphthongs.
For an infant (or foreigner) to gain access to the tertiary arrangement 
of language (the voice), it must pass through the secondary organization 
of language, which is the construction of the surface dimension of sense. 
This entails a long period of apprenticeship on the child’s part. Out of 
the continuous flow of the Voice on High, the child will begin to extract 
intensive elements of different orders, freeing them up in order to give 
them functions that are not yet linguistic. One might see this as an early 
formulation of Deleuze’s theory of flows: the voice is a flow from which 
non-signifying elements are extracted and combined. The first words of 
the infant are not formed linguistic units, but merely formative elements: 
phonemes, morphemes, semantemes. The fundamental thesis of the logic 
of sense is that “sense always results from the combination of elements 
which are not themselves signifying”.33
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Deleuze analyzes this surface organization of sense in terms of three 
moments, which are defined by three types of series or syntheses: con-
nective, conjunctive, and disjunctive syntheses. (1) In the first moment 
(connection), the child extracts pure phonemes from the current of the 
Voice on High, and connects them together in “a concatenation of suc-
cessive entities” such as ma ma, da da, or bay bee, which can then enter 
into more complex relations, or even an alignment of clusters.34 (2) In 
the second moment (conjunction), there is the construction of the first 
esoteric words out of these phonemes, which is brought about not by a 
simple addition of preceding phonemes, but rather through the integra-
tion of the phonemes into convergent and continuous series, as in Lewis 
Carroll’s contraction of your royal highness into y’reince.35 Such a con-
traction aims at the extraction of the global sense of an entire proposition 
in order to name it with a single syllable—what Carroll calls an “unpro-
nounceable monosyllable”.36 (3) In the third moment (disjunction), the 
child starts making these esoteric words enter into relation with other 
divergent and independent series. If Logic of Sense presents itself in part 
as a reading of Lewis Carroll’s work, it is because Carroll was one of the 
great explorers of this surface dimension of sense. Although his famous 
portmanteau words seem to establish conjunctive syntheses between 
two heterogeneous series (snark = snake + shark; slithy = slimy + lithe; 
mimsy = flimsy + miserable), Deleuze argues that their deeper function 
is to create ramifications in the surface of sense. Carroll himself explains 
the functioning of the word “frumious” (fuming + furious) in disjunctive 
terms: “If your thoughts incline ever so little towards ‘fuming’, you will 
say ‘fuming-furious’; if they turn, even by a hair’s breadth, toward ‘furi-
ous’, you will say ‘furious-fuming’; but if you have the rarest of gifts, a 
perfectly balanced mind, you will say ‘frumious’ ”.37 Ultimately, the real 
definition of the portmanteau word, Deleuze argues, must be found in 
its ramifying function (or disjunctive synthesis) throughout the surface 
of sense.38
These three syntheses constitute the production of the surface of sense 
out of the voice.39 The structure of this surface corresponds to the com-
ponents of the “Idea” that Deleuze develops in Difference and Repeti-
tion: a multiplicity in which differential relations between determinable 
elements (e.g., phonemes) constitute singularities (e.g., esoteric words), 
in the “neighborhood” of which the sonorities and significations of lan-
guage will be constituted.40 A phoneme, for instance, is the smallest lin-
guistic unit capable of differentiating two words with different meanings: 
for instance, bat and cat. Although the phoneme is incarnated in letters, 
syllables, and sounds, it is not reducible to them. In itself, the phoneme is 
inseparable from the differential relation that unites it to other phonemes: 
b/c. Phonemes do not exist independent of the differential relations into 
which they enter and through which they reciprocally determine each 
other. In turn, esoteric words of different kinds guarantee the separation, 
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coordination, and ramifications of the various series that constitute the 
surface organization of sense and non-sense (the Idea). What distin-
guishes the secondary organization of sense (surface) from the primary 
order of noise (depth) is that “the depth is not organized in series”.41 
Thus, while the static genesis concerns the actualization of sense in a 
state of affairs (what is expressed in a proposition is attributed to a state 
of affairs), the dynamic genesis concerns the production of sense out of 
the depths of the body. “What matters here is the preliminary, founding 
or poetic organization—that is, this play of surfaces in which only an 
a-cosmic, impersonal, and pre-individual field is employed, this exercise 
of nonsense and sense, and this deployment of series which precede the 
elaborate products of the status genesis”.42
The surface of sense points to a domain that is difficult to access. On 
the one hand, it implies a dimension of speech that adults have long 
ago “forgotten”, even though each of us occupies the domain of sense 
continuously. If you are capable of understanding the propositions of an 
interlocutor, it is because you inhabit and sustain the structure of sense 
that underlies them. This is the function of the surface organization of 
sense: it separates sounds from the body and begins to turn them into the 
elements of speech. The creation of sense (out of non-signifying elements) 
is what allows the sounds coming out of one’s mouth to participate fully 
in a shared linguistic world. But the converse is also true. If a child comes 
to a language it cannot yet grasp as a language, but only as a familial hum 
of voices, perhaps conversely it can grasp what adults no longer grasp in 
their own language, namely the differential relations between the forma-
tive elements of language. From the flow of the voice, children extract 
elements of different orders, but they give them a function that is still 
pre-linguistic. For the child, there is “an apprenticeship of formative ele-
ments before there is any understanding of formed linguistic units” that 
would be able to denote things, manifest persons, or signify concepts.43 
What Deleuze says about language is equally true for living organisms: 
an embryo passes through experiences—foldings, migrations, and so 
on—that would destroy an adult. “Embryology already displays the 
truth that there are systematic vital movements, torsions and drifts, that 
only the embryo can sustain: an adult would be torn apart by them”.44 
The implication, as we have seen, is far-reaching: we are led astray when 
we focus on fully formed individuals in biology or fully formed proposi-
tions in linguistics.
It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the concept of 
sense in Deleuze’s work, and indeed in our own lives. If you are capable 
of understanding the propositions of an interlocutor, it is because of the 
element of sense that underlies them. Sense is this surface, this boundary, 
this frontier that exists between the noises of one’s body (the primary 
order) and the sentences of language (the tertiary arrangement). Sense is 
what allows the noises coming out of one’s mouth to participate fully in 
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the linguistic world we share. Moreover, as Merleau-Ponty showed, the 
same is true not only for the noises coming out of one’s mouth, but for 
the whole of one’s body, which is “expressive” through and through, 
having a sense in every one of its gestures (bodily intentionality).45 In 
other words, the same syntheses of sense are at work in the body of the 
infant. Indeed, how can they not be, since the dynamic genesis is what 
extracts the surface of sense from bodily states?46 As the body gets caught 
up in the system of language, Deleuze writes, “there is a co-system of 
sexuality that mimics sense, nonsense, and their surface organization”.47 
Long before the infant experiences its body (or its mother’s body) as an 
organism, it experiences its body as a geography of intensities and gra-
dients. Freud, for instance, identified “erogenous zones” of pregenital 
sexuality in the infant, each of which is a dynamic formation of a sur-
face space around a singularity constituted by an orifice surrounded by a 
mucous membrane (oral, anal, urethral zones), and development of the 
infant concerns the more general problem of organizing these surfaces 
and bringing about their coordination and integration. For Deleuze, the 
important idea is that there are orientations in the biopsychic life of the 
infant that have variable or shifting dimensions—an entire geography 
and geometry of living dimensions. The dynamic genesis is nothing other 
than the formation of surfaces (or zones) and their coordination, both in 
the body and in speech.
The Fragility of Sense: Two Types of Non-Sense  
(the Psychotic Procedure)
At the same time, we are also aware of the fundamental fragility of this 
surface domain of sense, and the fact that it can break down at any 
moment into non-sense. In fact, for Deleuze this domain of non-sense is 
even more revealing than the domain of sense—the sense–non-sense rela-
tion is far more important to philosophy than the truth–falsity relation, 
which depends on it. In fact, Deleuze distinguishes between two types of 
non-sense, the non-sense of as-yet inarticulate words (surface) and the 
non-sense of the body (depth). The second is more profound than the first: 
“What is essential is the threat that depth begins to be on all the other 
dimensions”.48
The first type of non-sense, as we have seen, is the non-sense of Lewis 
Carroll, who takes the formative elements of language and establishes 
new syntheses between them. Carroll’s famous poem Jabberwocky—
itself a portmanteau word, combining “jabber” (a voluble, animated, or 
chattering discussion) with “wocer” (offspring or fruit), that coincides 
with its function—begins with a famous first line: “Twas brillig, and the 
slithey toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe, all mimsy were the boro-
groves, and the mome raths outgrabe”. To which Alice responds, “Some-
how it seems to fill my head with ideas—only I don’t exactly know what 
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they are!”49 The poem seemed to make sense to Alice, but she nonetheless 
had no idea what it was about. It seems to make “sense” because Car-
roll combines the formative elements of language in a way that produces 
in Alice a feeling of sense, even though the combination of elements lies 
outside the tertiary structure of language. “Slithey” is a combination of 
“slimy” and “lithe”, and thus seems to have a sense, even though it is a 
non-sensical combination of elements.
But there is a second kind of non-sense, which is exemplified in the 
schizophrenic writings of Antonin Artaud. Artaud did not admire Lewis 
Carroll, and he used a rather technical term to describe Carroll’s writ-
ing: pigshit (la cochonnerie).50 Artaud speaks of the “caca of being and 
of its language”.51 The reason: Carroll remained at the surface, play-
ing his little combinatorial game, combining “shark” and “snake” 
into “snark” and making a poem out of it. But that kind of non-sense 
is nothing—absolutely nothing—compared with the non-sense of the 
body, with its pure intensities and noises, which Artaud expressed in his 
“scream-breaths”, his cris-souffles—and which was tied, moreover, to a 
schizophrenic pathology, to an extraordinary lived experience. Artaud 
followed the reverse path of the infant, though “regression” is hardly an 
adequate concept for this process. The infant starts in the primary order 
of the body, and attains the tertiary arrangement of language by passing 
through—or rather constructing—the secondary organization of sense. 
And yet, as Artaud knew, “nothing is more fragile than the surface”.52
Artaud’s pathos moved in the opposite direction. The tertiary arrange-
ment of language (the proposition) is “grounded” in the “secondary 
organization” of sense (which is what Carroll plays with). And yet, fol-
lowing what Deleuze sometimes calls the “bend” or “twist” in sufficient 
reason, the dimension of sense itself threatens to collapse into the un-
grounded “primary order” of noise. In the primary order of schizophre-
nia, “there is no longer anything to prevent propositions from falling back 
onto bodies and from mingling their sonorous elements with the body’s 
olfactory, gustatory, or digestive effects. Not only is there no longer any 
sense, but there is no longer any grammar or syntax either—nor, at the 
limit, are there any articulated syllabic, literal, or phonetic elements”.53 
There are only Artaud’s cris-souffles, which are “the asyntactical limit 
toward which all language tends”: “Ratara ratara ratara Atara tatara 
rana Otara otara katara”.54 The schizophrenic treats words as if they 
were things; “things and proposition no longer have any frontier between 
them”.55 The schizophrenic body is no longer anything but depth; it no 
longer has a surface organization. The surface has collapsed.56
Indeed, Deleuze will argue that “psychosis is inseparable from a vari-
able linguistic procedure (procédé). The procedure is the very process 
of the psychosis”.57 One of his most important essays on this score is 
his essay entitled “Louis Wolfson; or, The Procedure”.58 Wolfson was 
a schizophrenic, but also a student of languages, and he developed a 
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specific procedure to deal with his English-speaking mother: whenever 
she began to speak, he would immediately “translate” her speech into a 
multi-lingual non-sense.
Given a word from the maternal language, he looks for a foreign 
word with a similar meaning that has common sounds or phonemes 
(preferably in French, German, Russian, or Hebrew, the four prin-
cipal languages studied by the author). For example, Where? will 
be translated as Wo? Hier? où? ici?, or better yet, as Woher. Tree 
will produce Tere, which phonetically becomes Dere, and leads to 
the Russian Derevo. Thus, an ordinary maternal sentence will be 
analyzed in terms of its phonetic elements and movements so that it 
can be converted into a sentence, in one or more foreign languages, 
which is similar in sound and meaning. . . . The sentence Don’t trip 
over the wire becomes Tu’nicht tréb über èth hé Zwirn.59
For Wolfson, his mother’s voice had to be stripped of its sense, with-
out delay, “decomposed into its phonetic elements and recomposed into 
inarticulate blocks”.60 It was never a question of recovering sense but of 
destroying the word and conjuring up an affect, transforming the painful 
passion of the body into a triumphant action, but “always in this depth 
beneath the fissured surface”.61 A  similar case was that of Jean-Pierre 
Brisset, whose procedure was to focus on words and phrases whose 
sounds were identical but whose meanings were completely different: 
prisoners were first drenched dans l’eau sale (in dirty water), they were 
dans la sale eau pris (taken away in dirty water), thus becoming salauds 
pris (saloperies) (captured bastards/shit), who were then sold in la salle 
aux prix/pris (the price room/the prisoner’s room).62 In Anti-Oedipus, 
Deleuze and Guattari discuss the case of a young patient of Bruno Bet-
tleheim named Joey, who would not only decompose words (“Connect-
icut” became “connect-I-cut”), but who could live, eat, defecate, and 
sleep “only if he is plugged into machines provided with motors, wires, 
lights, carburators, propellers, and steering wheels: an electrical feeding 
machine, a car-machine that enables him to breathe, an anal machine 
that lights up”.63 Deleuze has developed a set of interrelated concepts to 
analyze such cases: if the enunciable refers to a procedure (procédé), the 
visible refers to a process (processus), and taken together a procedure and 
a process constitute a proceeding (procedure). A proceeding is a combi-
nation of a visible process and an enunciative procedure.64
Deleuze compares these psychotic procedures with the well-known 
compositional procedure of the writer Raymond Roussel, to whom 
Michel Foucault devoted an important book.65 In his novel Impressions 
of Africa, Roussel famously converted an initial sentence (les lettres du 
blanc sur les bandes du vieux billard  =  the white man’s letters on the 
hoards of the old plunderer) into another sentence with similar sounds 
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and phonemes, but with a completely different meaning (les lettres du 
blanc sur les bandes du vieux pillard = the white letters on the cushions of 
the old billiard table). Roussel amplified the procedure, creating a novel 
that “surreptitiously tries to say two things with the same words”.66 
Unlike Wolfson or Brisset, Roussel was able to create a work of art from 
his procedure, filling up the interval between the original sentence and its 
conversion “with marvelously proliferating stories”.67
Is not perhaps the greatness—and the great pathos—of Artaud that 
he was able to speak and write out of the depths of the primary order 
of the body? Nietzsche was unable to do so, and lapsed into silence. 
We can nonetheless get a glimpse into the nature of Nietzsche’s delirium 
in the letters and postcards he wrote in the ten days following his ini-
tial collapse in 1889, in which his language takes on a purely intensive 
use. It directly expresses the “primary order” of Nietzsche’s body and its 
intensive states, each of which receives a proper name—some designat-
ing his “attractive” allies, or manic rises in intensity (Prado, Lesseps, 
Chambige, “honest criminals”, Dionysus), others designating his “repul-
sive” enemies, or depressive falls in intensity (Caiaphus, William, Bis-
mark, the “antisemites”, the Crucified)—a chaos of pure oscillations that 
is ultimately invested, as Nietzsche says, by “all the names of history”.68 
And yet, was it not precisely this experience that Nietzsche was confront-
ing throughout all his writings? At the end of Beyond Good and Evil, 
Nietzsche included a telling lament about his writing: “Alas, what are 
you after all, my written and painted thoughts? Alas, always only what 
is on the verge of withering and losing its fragrance! Alas, always only 
storms that are passing, exhausted, and feelings that are autumnal and 
yellow! Alas, always only birds that grew weary of flying and flew astray 
and now can be caught by the hand—by our hand. We immortalize what 
cannot live and fly much longer—only weary and mellow things!”69 
Nietzsche’s illness was not a part of the process, but rather an arrest or 
stopping of the process.70
But is Nietzsche’s or Artaud’s experience any different from our own? 
In a sense, yes, absolutely yes, since both shared a profound pathology 
most of us will never experience. In Logic of Sense, Deleuze muses about 
people like himself, writing on Artaud’s schizophrenia, Nietzsche’s col-
lapse, Hölderlin’s madness, Woolf’s suicide, Fitzgerald’s breakdown, and 
so on—all the while standing on the shore, dipping toes in the water, but 
unable to dive in and plunge beneath the surface.71 But in another sense, 
no, the experience is not so different, for a simple stammer or a stumbling 
over a word (a “Freudian slip”) is itself an intrusion of the dimension of 
noise, and is enough to indicate the fundamental fragility of the surface 
of sense, which covers the groundlessness that constantly threatens to 
bubble up and subsume everything, making us fall into “the undifferen-
tiated abyss of a groundlessness which only permits the pulsation of a 
monstrous body”.72
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The Intensive: Beyond the Literal and the Metaphorical
We seem to be far away from our theme of literality and metaphor, but we 
have never been so close. Let us return to Deleuze’s statement that we cited 
at the start: “There are no literal words, neither are there metaphors. . . . 
There are only inexact words to designate something exactly”.73 No less a 
thinker than Kant had made a similar observation in the Critique of Pure 
Reason: “Despite the great wealth of our languages, the thinker often 
finds himself at a loss for the expression which exactly fits his concept, 
and for want of which he is unable to be really intelligible to others or 
even to himself”.74 This is why Deleuze can define philosophy, famously, 
as the creation of concepts: philosophy is the creation of inexact words to 
designate something exactly, “literally”. From this viewpoint, the analy-
ses of concepts proposed in What Is Philosophy? are a transposition of 
the analysis of language provided in Logic of Sense. The path followed 
by the infant is to construct the secondary surface of sense in order to 
pass from the primary noise of the body to the tertiary arrangement of 
language. In creating concepts, the philosopher pursues a similar path, 
closer to Artaud’s, and attempts to follow (or create) a line of flight within 
language itself that will extract its formative or genetic elements (the com-
ponents of the concept) in order to create something new.
Strictly speaking, however, while it is easy to comprehend Deleuze’s 
rejection of the suggestion that his concepts are “mere” metaphors, it 
would likewise be inexact to say that Deleuze’s concepts must therefore 
be taken “literally”. The reason is that the literal-metaphorical distinc-
tion itself operates entirely within the realm of sense: it involves the 
movement from a “proper” meaning or sense of a word or phrase to a 
figurative or metaphorical meaning. At this level of analysis, it is easy to 
see how the phrase “the unconscious is a factory” can be understood in 
a metaphorical manner as a transfer of meaning from a literal to a figu-
rative sense. A factory is literally a milieu of production; to say that the 
unconscious is a factory is to transfer the literal sense of “production” 
(in a factory) in a figurative manner to a new milieu (in the unconscious). 
There is a transfer of meaning that operates there entirely within the first 
realm of sense (or expression).
But this is only the first aspect of sense: sense (or meaning) as an effect 
of propositions; meaning is what is “expressed” by a proposition. The 
second aspect, as we have seen, concerns sense as an element in the gen-
esis of propositions from its formative elements (the three syntheses), 
and it is this aspect that concerns us here. From this viewpoint, sense is 
the “ground” of language, but this ground itself rests on the “ground-
lessness” of the primary order of noise. (As geology and plate tectonics 
teach us, no ground is ever entirely secure.) This is why Artaud ultimately 
plays a more important role in Logic of Sense than does Carroll. Artaud’s 
intensive “scream-breaths”, uttered from the depth of his pathology (the 
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primary order), are worth far more than Carroll’s extensive word-plays, 
which remain at the surface (the secondary surface). The genesis of lan-
guage must be found at the relation between the intensive depth (noise) 
and the extensive surface (sense).
Thus, just as the sense–non-sense complementarity conditions the 
true-–false dichotomy (a proposition can be true or false only if it has a 
sense), one could say that the intensity-becoming complementarity condi-
tions the literal-metaphorical distinction. In several texts, Deleuze speaks 
of literary procedures, like those of Roussel, that go beyond sense and 
point to a purely intensive use of language. This can take place “when 
sense is actively neutralized . . . when there remains only enough of sense 
to direct the lines of escape . . . in order to liberate a living and expres-
sive material that speaks for itself and has no need of being put into a 
form”.75 Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, for instance, speaks of a
language, torn from sense. . . [that] no longer finds its value in any-
thing but an accenting of the word, an inflection. . . . Children are 
well skilled in the exercise of repeating a word, the sense of which 
is only vaguely felt, in order to make it vibrate around itself. Kafka 
tells how, as a child, he repeated one of his father’s expressions in 
order to make it take flight on a line of non-sense: “end of the month, 
end of the month”. . . . [The phrase] no longer forms anything but a 
sequence of intensive states, a ladder or circuit for intensities that one 
can make race around in one direction [sens] or another, from high 
to low, or from low to high. . . . There is no longer any proper sense 
or figurative sense, but only a distribution to states that is part of the 
range of the word.76
Like Artaud’s scream-breaths, the word here becomes linked with its 
own intensive conditions in the primary order. Such an intensive use of 
language marks what Deleuze calls a “line of flight” or a “line of escape”: 
“a language of sense is traversed by a line of escape in order to liberate 
a living and expressive material that speaks for itself and has no need of 
being put into a form”.77 What Deleuze calls a “minor” use of language 
is nothing other than an intensive use of language.
When Deleuze and Guattari published What Is Philosophy? in 1991, 
they similarly defined the components of philosophical concepts as 
“intensive ordinates”.78 The components of a concept are not spatiotem-
poral coordinates (extensions), but intensive ordinates that lie outside 
any coordinates (pure events). Intensive ordinates are “pure and sim-
ple” singularities that are brought together in the concept through the 
establishment of “zones of indiscernibility” between them.79 The Car-
tesian concept of the cogito, for instance, has as its intensive ordinates 
the concept of doubting, thinking, and being. To create a concept is “to 
make the sequences vibrate, to open the word onto unexpected internal 
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intensities”.80 Like the literary procedures of Roussel and Kafka, the cre-
ation of concepts is an asignifying and intensive utilization of language.
It is in this manner that we must understand Deleuze’s claims such 
as “the unconscious is a factory”. As long as we remain at the tertiary 
arrangement of language or the secondary organization of sense, we can-
not help but see the relationship between the two words as a kind of 
transfer of sense, a relationship of resemblance, or imitation, or mimesis, 
or even an imaginary identification. But once we reach the intensive level, 
the relationship between the two words becomes, precisely, a relationship 
of becoming. A zone of indiscernibility is established between the two 
words “unconscious” and “factory”, such that we can say that the uncon-
scious literally is a factory, or more precisely, becomes a factory. This is 
what happens in Wuthering Heights, when Emily Brontë has Catherine 
say, “I am Heathcliff”, or in Moby Dick, when Herman Melville says 
that Captain Ahab “becomes” Moby Dick. Catherine does not “really” 
become Heathcliff any more than Ahab “really” becomes a whale. In a 
becoming, one term does not simply resemble the other; rather, each term 
encounters the other, and the becoming is something that passes between 
the two, outside the two. In literature, this “in between” is a pure affect 
or percept, such that both Ahab and Moby Dick lose their status as sub-
jects in favor of “an infinitely proliferating patchwork” of affects that 
escape their form, like the “the furrows that twist from Ahab’s brow to 
that of the Whale”.81
One could say that, in philosophy, these inbetweens, or these becom-
ings, produce concepts. When Deleuze says that “the unconscious is a 
factory”, it marks the becoming of the concept of the unconscious, or 
rather (which amounts to the same thing) the creation of a new concept. 
Deleuze defines concepts as multiplicities, but a multiplicity is defined by 
the limits and borders where it enters into relations with other multiplici-
ties and changes nature, transforms itself, and follows a “line of flight” 
(even while remaining itself). When Deleuze says that “the unconscious is 
a factory”, he makes the concept of the unconscious enter into a becom-
ing. The phrase creates an objective zone of indistinction or indiscern-
ibility that always exists between any two multiplicities—in this case, 
the two concepts or terms—and that precedes their taking on a sense.82 
Indeed, it is only by entering into this becoming that the term “the uncon-
scious” can be said to have taken on a new sense, a new “literal” sense 
(this unconscious is a factory, and not a theater). Or, put differently, the 
concept of the unconscious can be said to have changed, to have altered 
one of its intensive ordinates. The intensive primary order is the condi-
tion that makes possible “the perpetual, invisible, and silent displacement 
of linguistic sense”.83
For Deleuze, this is the very movement of thought itself, the creation of 
the new within thought. Our ordinary use of language is extensive—or, 
in the language of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, it is reterritorializing. 
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Language is a deterritorialization of noise that becomes reterritorialized 
in sense; and it is sense that allows the noises of the body to become 
linguistic elements. This is what Deleuze means when he speaks of a 
“minor” use of language (in philosophy or elsewhere), or cites Proust’s 
phrase that writers create a kind of foreign language within their own 
language. It is a process that involves taking any linguistic variable—
phonological, semantic, syntactical, or grammatical—and placing it in 
variation, pushing language to the point where it “stops being repre-
sentative in order to move toward its extremities or its limits”,84 in order 
to create new possibilities within thought itself. Style and philosophy in 
this way come together: “This is what style is, or rather the absence of 
style—asyntactic, agrammatical: the moment when language is no longer 
defined by what it says .  .  . but by what causes it to move, to flow, to 
explode. . . . For [philosophy] is like schizophrenia: a process and not a 
goal . . . a pure process that fulfills itself, and that never ceases to reach 
fulfillment as it proceeds—[philosophy] as ‘experimentation’ ”.85 A philo-
sophical concept is not a metaphor but a metamorphosis.
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